ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Today, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) plays an important and popular role in variety of applications explicitly for its system implementation design and the ease of manufacturing. It provides identifying, target tracking, ambient condition sensing, guarding patient safety etc.
So many system-wise demandable advantages justify the means to choose the RFID system improvements as an interesting research subject. This is indeed noticeable throughout the literature on RFID [1, 2] .
Furthermore, within RFID system structure context, many lightweight RFID authentication protocols [3] [4] [5] and grouping proof protocols [6] [7] [8] are proposed to be implemented over the practically required secure RFID channels. Recently, the grouping proof protocol is adopted to improve patient safety. It avoids death due to medication related errors, but such protocols suffer from de-synchronization as well as replay attacks [7, 8] . However, many security requirements such as tag synchronization together with privacy cannot be preserved by most of the published protocols for lightweight authentication scheme [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
In 2010, Zhuo et al. proposed a lightweight anti-de-synchronization RFID authentication protocol [15] . They claimed their protocol would be secure against all attacks on RFID systems. However, in 2010, Yu et al. proposed a real lightweight binding proof protocol to guard the patient safety. Their protocol doesn't employ any complicated security algorithms but use only simple logic gates such as AND and XOR operations. They claimed that their proposed grouping proof protocol can resist against de-synchronization and replay attacks and can also support tag anonymity [16] .
However, this contribution reveals Zhuo et al's protocol vulnerability to de-synchronization attack. We show Yu et al's protocol is also vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and is not secure against tracking the movements of the tags. This paper also proposes solutions to fix the security flaws just explained for both protocols.
Moreover, the next section reviews Zhuo et al.'s lightweight authentication protocol and its weakness, to propose appropriate solutions against the vulnerable attack. In section 3, Yuo et al.'s lightweight binding proof protocol with its weaknesses is described, and the proposed solutions are provided to resist the protocol from de-synchronization attack as well as tracking the movements of the tags. Finally, section 4 provides the full research work summary.
ZHUO ET AL.'S LIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (WEAKNESS AND SOLUTION)

A Review of Zhuo et al.'s Lightweight Authentication Protocol
Zhuo et al. proposed a lightweight anti-de-synchronization RFID authentication protocol [15] . In their procedure, tags are passive and they only need to have a secure one-way hash function (i.e. a H(.) function) and Exclusive-OR operations. They assume each tag (e.g., the i th tag) shares a secret key, Step1. A reader generates a random number r to transmit it to i th tag.
Step2. Step5. This is the step that the reader has received R and n-right part, so it sends them to the i th tag.
Step6. Upon the reception of R and n-right part 
Weakness of Zhuo et al's Lightweight Authentication Protocol
Unfortunately, the described Zhuo et al's protocol is obviously vulnerable to de-synchronization attack. This can be observed by making a trivial assumption that the attacker can observe and manipulate communication link between the tags and the reader. This attack can be performed as follows;
An attacker eavesdrops {a, r, m-left, IDS i } by the last execution. Later, when the reader sends a random number r' to the tag for the next execution, the attacker has intercepted it from the reader before forwarding it to the tag. Then, the attacker can reply to the reader instead of the tag, using the parameters obtained from the last execution (i.e. a reply attack). In this context, the attacker computes , so the authentication is correctly performed which is in fact to equalize ) ' ' ( ) (
. Therefore, the backend server updates Such an attack on a tag causes loss of synchronization between the tag and the backend server as shown in Figure 2 . Later, when the attacked tag wants to use its key and unique indexpseudonym, the backend server identifies the tag as an illegal tag. Because, when the backend server does the comparisons Suppose that an attacker is going to use m again. Thus, the attacker has to modify m in order to show that it is generated using r'. However, the attacker do not know i key and i C . Thus, a' must be found to satisfy )
. However, it is computationally infeasible since r' and a' contributes to the hash padding. So, the attacking aperture is locked up permanently. Figure 3 for justification purposes only.
YU ET AL.'S LIGHTWEIGHT BINDING PROOF PROTOCOL (WEAKNESSES
Step1. The reader broadcasts "Hello" in its working range. Step8. After the approval process is completed, both tags will embark into the key update process. The key update algorithm considering instead of r, because the tag A computes r as:
Weaknesses of Yu et al.'s Lightweight Binding Proof Protocol
to check the correctness of r'. This comparison is absolutely correct because: 
b. Tracking the movements of the tag
Consider the attacker has an ability to track the movements of the tags A and B. For this attack, it is assumed that the given scheme is performed twice to ensure the attacker the two program executions are for the same tags or not. This technique is briefly described as follows: Therefore, such modifications can lead to strengthen the protocol security against the mentioned weaknesses, i.e. de-synchronization attack and tracking the movements of the tags.
CONCLUSIONS
The investigations over two recently lightweight protocols for RFID system show that they suffer from many serious security weaknesses in spite of claims given by the protocols pioneers. These problems are found to be the two attacks called de-synchronization attack and tracking the movements of the tags. This contribution is indeed to prevent such given protocols security weaknesses employing concatenation operation on the first protocol and rotation process on the second protocol. Hence, with these improvements, both Zhou et al.'s and Yu et al.'s protocols can be used for secure RFID applications such as identifying and guarding patient safety.
